The Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management in a Concerted Weimar Effort

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Summary

EU crisis management is at a critical juncture as the EU has to put the ESDP and the new established EEAS on a sound footing to be able to deliver on its hallmark of a distinctly civil-military identity. A recent initiative by the countries of the Weimar Triangle – France, Germany and Poland – offers the momentum to advance towards a comprehensive strategy of crisis management.

This paper presents the current challenges surrounding the much-used, though (in its entirety) little-understood concept of a “comprehensive approach” and how the EU tries to implement it. It then outlines the proposal made by the three member states of the Weimar Triangle and finally makes some proposals regarding the way forward until the first Polish EU presidency in the second semester of 2011, including an opening of the Weimar CSDP process to the representatives of other member states (“Weimar plus X”); an enhanced cooperation with NATO through a ‘Berlin plus reverse’; and the extension of the Headline Goal 2010 to a comprehensive civil-military one.

The excitement of the early years of EU crisis management after the first missions were deployed in 2003 is over. Despite the enthusiasm about the EU’s erstwhile willingness to intervene in complex crisis abroad, it has only a very mixed record about these past missions. If the EU truly aims at a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management as a European hallmark, it has to instil this into the new Foreign Service both in conceptual terms and by institutional arrangements. Furthermore, although some of the main pledges of the military Headline Goal 2010 have been broadly fulfilled, the EU still lacks an autonomous planning and conduct capability for civil-military operations.

With the “Weimar package” presented at the end of April 2010 in Bonn, the three foreign ministers proposed a number of initiatives in the field of security policy, inter alia a joint European operational headquarter and an adaptation of the French-Polish-German battle group to more complex operational needs. While it is clear that, in defence matters, no progress is possible without the United Kingdom, there are many arguments in favour of this Franco-German-Polish initiative.
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These days, the Lisbon Treaty’s first anniversary is reason to celebrate for many in Brussels and other European quarters. This notwithstanding, it brought only few formal changes and hardly any new momentum to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as it is called now. Still the main institutional innovations in the broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of course have their repercussions, e.g. through new crisis management coordination mechanisms in the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR), Catherine Ashton.

EU crisis management is thus at a critical juncture, though one of improved consolidation rather than renewed expansion. The excitement of the early years after the first missions were deployed in 2003 is over. For two important and interlinked reasons, it is now time to settle things. First of all, despite the enthusiasm about the EU’s erstwhile willingness to intervene in complex crisis abroad, these past missions have resulted in a very mixed record. This is the clear result of a number of stock-taking exercises done after ten years of ESDP. Secondly, if the EU truly aims at a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management as a European hallmark, it has to instil this into the new Foreign Service both in conceptual terms and by institutional arrangements. Regarding the latter, the fact that the bulk of competences in the civilian field (such as for humanitarian aid and development) has remained with the Commission, does not bode well for future cooperation.

It appears as a coincidence that at the end of the last year it was also time for an evaluation of the military Headline Goal (HG) 2010. Back in 2004 and after passing the European Security Strategy (ESS), member states committed the EU “by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations”. While it is right to argue that some of the main pledges of that time – creating rapidly deployable battle groups and establishing the European Defence Agency – have been broadly fulfilled, the EU still lacks an autonomous planning and conduct capability for civil-military operations (plus, of course, the much-needed strategic airlift capacity, which will however not be treated in this paper).

In this regard, it is of interest that the Weimar Triangle of France, Poland and Germany received a boost earlier last year. With the “Weimar package” presented at the end of April 2010 in Bonn, the three foreign ministers proposed a number of initiatives in the field of security policy, inter alia a joint European operational headquarter (OHQ) and an adaptation of the French-Polish-German battle group to more complex operational needs. While it is clear that, in defence matters, no progress is possible without the United Kingdom (UK), there are two arguments in favour of this Franco-German-Polish initiative.
International crisis management has undergone a major transition over the past two decades. Given the new threats emanating from weak states, asymmetric conflicts, organised crime, and terrorism, traditional peacekeeping has frequently given way to complex peacebuilding in protracted conflicts. This makes it difficult to draw a line between the actual conflict management and the post-conflict reconstruction and development.

A comprehensive approach also requires the parallel deployment of civilian and military actors, thus making coordination at all levels – i.e. civil-civil (e.g. diplomats, aid workers, and policemen), civil-military (e.g. soldiers and legal experts), and military-military (e.g. from different troop-contributing countries) – and at all stages of the crisis management cycle a necessity. Most obviously, the military is required to secure the mission environment for civilians to conduct their work. Moreover, there has been an increase in police missions deployed since the mid-1990s, in particular of gendarmerie forces with an executive mandate. Such coordination also applies to the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. More broadly speaking, both civilian and military instruments apply to the important aspects of security sector reform (SSR),
which aims to create viable and legitimate military, police, and legal structures within a post-conflict society.

In addition to these new tasks, the complexity of crisis management and peacebuilding has become manifest both in longer timelines and an increasing number of actors involved. Sustainable crisis management goes way beyond an ad-hoc intervention to stop a conflict and includes anything from conflict prevention to peace consolidation. Looking only at the most prominent conflicts after the end of the Cold War (in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Afghanistan), such an engagement can easily last for a decade or more.

Given the variety of tasks to fulfil, it is also obvious that no single actor can provide all the instruments and expertise needed for the different stages. At the national level of states trying to manage a conflict, different ministries and NGOs are already involved. In the conflict area, there are governmental representatives, different warring factions, and again civil society actors to attend to. Finally, internationally, formal organisations – like the UN or regional ones like the African Union – are as much part of the effort as are interested states that usually unite in a “group of friends” format.

Against the backdrop of this crisis scenario, a comprehensive approach to crisis management has been at the heart of the EU’s CSDP activities ever since the first missions were launched in early 2003. It is enshrined in the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003) and outlined in more detail in a joint Council/Commission paper in 2003 (Council of the European Union and European Commission 2003). Both highlight the number of instruments that are already available to the EU – including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities – and the necessity to apply a mixture of instruments to the threats of the 21st century, as none of them can be tackled by purely military means. More fundamentally, the comprehensive approach of course builds on the EU’s goals and values that it aims to pursue in its foreign policy, as described in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

With the strategy formally in place and the threats and instruments – though still pertaining to different EU institutions – supposedly in sync, the main challenge arises from the practical co-ordination of the whole range of such instruments from the purely civilian to the all-out military. After the first ESDP operations had shown the limitations of such efforts, the EU tried to formalise the process of Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), notably by bringing together both the Council Secretariat and the respective Commission directorates in a joint planning process. Due to the parallel development of most civilian instruments...
under Commission auspices and all CFSP/ESDP operations under the Council’s rule, EU crisis management instruments are often subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes. CMCO can thus be defined as “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis”\textsuperscript{11}.

The years following the first ESDP deployments have thus been characterised by a stronger emphasis on the need to strengthen the structures and capabilities of ESDP crisis management as such\textsuperscript{12}. At first, a Civil-Military (CivMil) Cell was created in May 2005 to ensure civil-military integration both for planning capacities and in actual operations. It was placed with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) which is located within the Council Secretariat and reports to the EU Military Committee (EUMC), composed of member states representatives\textsuperscript{13}. Later, in 2007, a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was set up out of directorate-general for civilian crisis management (DG E IX) within the Secretariat. It is now the civilian counterpart to the military chain of command running through the EUMS, headed by a Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpCdr) who is responsible for the operational planning, command and control of civilian missions. A third step was the establishment of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) by merging the remainder of DG IX with the directorate-general for defence aspects (DG E VIII). The task of CMPD is to provide political decision-makers with a comprehensive view on unfolding crises as well as to coordinate the planning and deployment of civilian and military capabilities.

This short description of both the demands for a new approach to crisis management on the ground as well as the corresponding institutional reforms in the Brussels headquarters of the EU exemplifies a simple fact: crisis management has become complexity management\textsuperscript{14}. It remains to be seen to what extent the current build-up of the EEAS, can contribute to managing the complexity of crises, both internally and externally. This major institutional transformation notwithstanding, there are smaller initiatives that aim to enhance civil-military synergies within the EU, such as the Weimar initiative of France, Poland, and Germany.

\section*{The Weimar CSDP Initiative}

The Weimar Triangle has been in existence since 1991, when for the first time the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland – Roland Dumas, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Krzysztof Skubiszewski respectively – met in the German city of Weimar to start a closer cooperation between the three countries. While this format was certainly useful in the time of...
Poland’s accession negotiations, it has not really become operational to the extent that it would provide important stimuli for the European debate. This may now be different, not least due to changes in leadership both on the Polish and German as well as on the French side.

In their meeting in April 2010, the three foreign ministers presented an initiative to foster the EU’s security and defence policy. In mid-December, this initiative was formally introduced into the European debate by a letter from the Three to the High Representative, Catherine Ashton. Even before that, the content of the proposal was discussed among policymakers and experts alike (cf. Major 2010). This is because, if put into practice, the initiative would indeed mark a major step forward for CSDP.

1. First of all, the Weimar group proposes to establish a permanent civil-military planning and conduct capability. In principle, civil-military planning should be determined by the political analysis of a crisis and should follow the political objectives set to end the crisis. This has recently become dramatically apparent in Afghanistan, where both the scale of the necessary reconstruction and the likely insurgency and the means needed for this complex mission were underestimated at the start of operations in 2001.

Under the existing structures, the CMPD is responsible for drafting a crisis management concept as the basis for a Council decision. Once the member states have decided to launch an operation, they activate an operational headquarters (OHQ) tasked with the more detailed planning and conduct of the operation. The only EU proper institution that could function as an OHQ at the moment is the Operations Centre (EU OpsCentre) within the EUMS.

Because this “autonomous” option would come with a political baggage unwanted by some of the member states, it has not yet been chosen for the conduct of an EU operation. Instead, the latter were led either by an OHQ in one of the member states or through NATO facilities. In the former case, an existing national headquarters (HQ) becomes “multinationalised” to plan and command the EU-led military operation. France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom are the five member states that have declared the availability of their national HQs, thus providing the EU with the premises and technical infrastructure needed to run a military operation. This “multinational” option was chosen for the management of two military operations in the D.R. Congo, namely for operation “Artemis” in 2003 (run by the French parent-HQ in Paris) and for operation EUFOR DRC in 2006 (run by the German parent-HQ in Potsdam), as well as for EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2007 (like “Artemis” run from the Paris HQ).

Alternatively, the EU could rely on the “Berlin plus” arrangement with NATO by making through recourse to the capabilities and common assets of the Alliance. Under
this arrangement, the EU can make use of command and control options such as the NATO OHQ located at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Mons, Belgium, and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SACEUR) as the operation commander. The EU relies on this option for example in the conduct of Operation EUFOR “Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The great disadvantages of the two options (and a half, if you count the so far unused EU OpsCentre) are their inefficiency and their focus on military matters only. Both the national and NATO OHQs can be activated only after a decision to launch a military operation has been taken. This way, their expertise cannot be tied into the early stages of the crisis management planning process. Similarly, once the OHQ has taken over, it would rework and refine the plan elaborated by CMPD but without a direct institutional link. Moreover, when this planning is conducted either at the national or NATO level, the personnel involved often lack specific EU expertise. For national OHQs, this is compounded by a lack of practical experience due to the low number of operations that each nation regularly leads. Lastly, because national OHQs are in standby only, they will have to be augmented both in terms of personnel and infrastructure once the decision to launch an operation has been taken by the EU. This can cause considerable delays at a moment when time is critical.

On the other hand, the major advantage of the Weimar proposal is that the OHQ would be both permanent in its structure and civil-military in its orientation. This would enable the EU to fully implement the comprehensive approach in its planning and conduct capabilities, providing an institutional memory as much as translating the approach from the OHQ to the field headquarters (FHQ) and the troops as well as civilian actors in theatre.

2. Secondly, the foreign ministers of the Weimar Triangle proposed to transform the Franco-Polish-German battle group, scheduled for duty in the first half of 2013, into an integrated unit. This multinational force of around 1500 troops with comprehensive military and civilian capabilities would support the EU’s ability for rapid crisis reaction. As such, it would provide a model not only for tangible cooperation among the three member states but also for operationalising the comprehensive approach.

Different from the planning and conduct capability described above, the concept of battle groups is so far a primarily military one. This pertains to member states (except Denmark, but including non-members such as Norway, Turkey, and Croatia) maintaining two battalion-size forces
(in either multinational or single-nation formations) in a state of high readiness for a period of six months – including the availability of strategic lift as well as combat and service support. It was Britain, France, and Germany that proposed this concept in 2004 as a means to facilitate rapid EU support to a UN operation.

Battle groups are expected to be operational within fifteen days and to operate for three months once in the field. They are an entry force, moving into a crisis-hit area mainly with the task of stabilising the situation. Based on their extensive combat capabilities, battle groups should provide active security, e.g. by patrolling and protecting selected facilities such as refugee camps, and, if needed, also engage in combat, e.g. when fighting off rebel attacks.

The primary aim of preparing or supporting the deployment of a more complex UN peacebuilding operation, however, puts these troops squarely into the civil-military field. Also in the EU context, the battle groups are likely to be used in circumstances that require close cooperation with civilian actors, whether during the operation or, at the latest, when planning for a mission exit. In particular, they might work with one of the rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) that can be used for fact-finding missions, supporting the deployment of a crisis management operation, or in assistance of an EU Special Representative (EUSR). Either way, these scenarios highlight the need to integrate the battle groups into the entire crisis management planning as well as to modify their composition so that they contain civilian elements.

The fact that not a single battle group has ever been deployed does not render the concept as such useless, for at least two reasons. Firstly, they have compelled member states to invest in the interoperability of their troops, amounting to a defence modernisation program aimed to ensure that national contingents can effectively work together. Secondly, it contains the nucleus if not of a European Army – a term that has been a political non-starter ever since the European Defence Community failed in 1952 – but of the truly civil-military planning and conduct of EU operations. This is the innovative angle of the Weimar proposal and the one that should be pursued in 2011.

**The Way forward**

The first trio presidency under the Lisbon Treaty will come to a close at the end of June 2011. Spain, Belgium, and Hungary will by then have set an example of how the rotating presidency can work under the permanent presidency of the European Council held by Herman van Rompuy. With regard to CFSP, the focus will have been on setting up the EEAS and finding a new inter-institutional balance between the old and new players, i.e. member states, the EEAS, the Commission, and – half-new at least in the arrogated competences –
the Parliament. While the strengthening of CSDP is of course on the trio’s agenda, this is rather part of the ‘inherited agenda’ that every presidency has to take care of than a genuine focus of the three.

In contrast, Poland has repeatedly declared that it would make the advancement of European security structures a priority of its own presidency starting in July 2011. This is because of – rather than despite – its traditional transatlantic preference, as Poland, like other Central European countries, wants to see NATO and the EU standing side by side in solving political and military crises. Although, in principle, Council working groups on CFSP and CSDP matters as well as with a geographic focus will be chaired by a representative of HR Ashton, the Polish presidency falls into a transition period where it can possibly still exert some influence on the debates in the working groups.

This focus, however, makes Poland’s half-year stint at the EU’s helm a special one within the trio it forms together with Denmark and Cyprus. Although being a NATO member, Denmark has an opt-out from CSDP; Cyprus, in contrast, is not a member of the Alliance but rather the stumbling block – due to the clash of Greece and Turkey over Northern Cyprus – for an efficient cooperation between EU and NATO. So while there is a good chance that Poland will continue to hold the baton on CSDP matters during the Danish presidency, it will have to make sure that all initiatives are brought to a close before the Cypriotes take over.

Poland’s ambition to shape the CSDP agenda and with it the success of the Weimar initiative thus depends on the political will of member states to make real progress in this area. The first hurdle for this is to find an internal agreement between the foreign and defence ministries of each countries. These are the ministries most relevant to CSDP matters, yet they often tend to view crisis management from different angles. Bridging this domestic divide is the first step towards a civil-military approach at the European level.

In this regard, the three countries therefore should work closely with the Hungarian presidency on ‘Europeising’ their initiative. Now that the latter has been formalised by way of the letter to Baroness Ashton, they can tie other member states into the initiative, including – but certainly not limited to – the United Kingdom (as the other main military power next to France, able also to bring the United States on board) and the Nordic countries (as ardent supporters of the civilian side of CSDP). In this sense, it could be advisable to open the Weimar process – on limited occasions and with a clear thematic focus on this initiative – to the representatives of other member states in a so-called “Weimar plus X” format.

In substantive matters, the countries of the Weimar Triangle have to prove that a revival of CSDP would ultimately reinforce
rather than sideline NATO. With the importance it places on US-European relations, Poland is a good candidate to do just that. During the Alliance’s summit in Lisbon in November last year, NATO leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept. While the broader strategic issues were dominating the discussions – the war in Afghanistan, a continent-wide missile defence system, or the dangers of cyber warfare – the question to what extent NATO should ‘go civil-military’ was also on the agenda. This smacked of a ‘re-duplication’ after the EU embarked on military operations, which should be avoided for reasons of both conceptual clarity and operational efficiency. So especially those 21 EU member states that are also members of the Alliance would do well to work towards a ‘Berlin plus reverse’ agreement where the EU offers its civil-military planning and conduct capabilities to NATO once the latter decides to embark on such a mission. More than being merely a confidence-building measure, this would signal an end of the institutional rivalry by making it clear where the strengths of each organisation lie: For NATO in the military field, for the EU in the civil-military realm.

The battle groups are of particular importance in this regard. Originally conceived as rapid military response forces to be deployed in war-like conditions, they would have been of little use in the vast majority of civilian or civil-military CSDP missions to date, which usually did not require any intensive or swift engagement of EU units. The question is, therefore: should member states keep two military-only battle groups on standby to be deployed only in the gravest crisis situations? Or would it not be more useful to extend the current focus on army battalions to permanently include both navy and air force elements as well as a civilian component?

This latter concept of ‘battle groups plus’ would have the advantage that their deployment in the near future is rather probable. In contrast, member states are likely to continue to shy away from the purely military engagement foreseen for the battle groups at present. Were member states to agree on a reform of the Athena mechanism for the common funding of EU operations, especially in the area of deployability (i.e. strategic lift), this would additionally lower the threshold of actually using this instrument for the first time.

Most importantly, a reformed battle group concept should be part of the EU’s debate to what extent it has in fact reached the Headline Goal declared in 2004. So far, there is no willingness discernable, neither among member states nor in the EU institutions, to evaluate these goals at all (let alone in a transparent manner) and draw the necessary conclusions for the setup of the EU’s crisis management structures. By declaring the need to strengthen the EU’s military and civilian capabilities, the European
Council of December 2008 set new specific numerical targets for its crisis management ambitions, however without specifying a date: “[In] the years ahead Europe should actually be capable, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days for a major operation, […] and of planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope”22.

It is important that the newly specified targets not only contain a deadline, but also relate to a proper evaluation of the efforts undertaken so far as well as an inclusion of the civil-military domain. Only then can the reformed crisis management structures under the newly created EU Foreign Service develop their full potential.

The Weimar initiative with the permanent European OHQ and the Franco-Polish-German battle group it proposes comes at the right moment to foster not only the debate about EU crisis management but also actually its operational side. Strongly geared towards the civil-military side, its implementation would eliminate inefficiencies in the current planning structures, yield cost benefits by making it unnecessary to maintain five national OHQs on standby, increase the probability of actually deploying a reformed battle group, and underscore the EU’s approach to comprehensive crisis management. Finally, it would provide an important signal that Europeanisation rather than re-nationalisation is the order of the day also in the field of security and defence.
Endnotes

(1) The author would like to thank Claudia Major for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, while retaining responsibility for all remaining errors and omissions.

(2) When writing about the pre-Lisbon security and defence policy, the term „ESDP“ is used.


(4) Major and Mölling 2010b

(5) European Council 2004, 1

(6) Auswärtiges Amt 2010

(7) Ministry of Defence 2010

(8) cf. Overhaus 2010

(9) cf. Mölling 2008

(10) See also the more specific concepts both the Council and the Commission developed for the implementation of SSR and DDR policies (Council of the European Union 2005, European Commission 2006, European Commission and Council of the European Union 2006).

(11) Council of the European Union and European Commission 2003, 2

(12) cf. Grevi 2009, 22

(13) cf. Quille et al. 2006

(14) cf. Major and Mölling 2009

(15) While the centre-right government of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in power since November 2007, is generally seen as more Europhile and less Germanophobic than its predecessor, the German Merkel-Westerwelle government explicitly referred to strengthening the Weimar Triangle in its coalition agreement of October 2009.

(16) cf. Lindstrom 2007, 9-26

(17) For a comprehensive overview of the instrument of EUSR and how it works as a boundary spanner both between the civilian and military side of CFSP and between the Commission and the Council competences of European foreign policy, see Adebahr 2009.

(18) cf. Witney 2008, 33; Major and Mölling 2010a, 6


(20) cf. Auswärtiges Amt 2010, Sikorski 2010

(21) cf. Vanhoonacker, Pomorska and Maurer 2010, 14

(22) Council of the European Union 2008, 1
Abbreviations

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CivMil - Civil-Military
CivOpCdr - Civilian Operations Commander
CMCO - Civil-Military Co-ordination
CMPD - Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC - Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT - Civilian Response Team
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DG E VIII - Directorate-General for defence aspects
DG E IX - Directorate-General for civilian crisis management
D.R. Congo - Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEAS - European External Action Service
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
ESS - European Security Strategy
EU - European Union
EU OpsCentre - European Union Operations Centre
EUFOR DRC - European Union Force Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUFOR Chad/CAR - European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
EUMC - European Union Military Committee
EUMS - European Union Military Staff
EUSR - European Union Special Representative
FHQ - Field Headquarter
HG - Headline Goal
HQ - Headquarter
HR - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non-governmental organisation
OHQ - European operational Headquarter
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SSR - Security Sector Reform
TEU - Treaty on European Union
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
US - United States
Bibliography


About the Author

Cornelius Adebahr is a political scientist and entrepreneur based in Berlin, Germany, focusing on European foreign policy issues, transatlantic relations, and South-Eastern Europe. Since the end of 2000, he has been the owner of Wirtschaft am Wasserturm – Political Consultancy, Project Development, and Training.

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Cornelius Adebahr served as project assistant at the Aspen Institute Berlin and as an election supervisor with the OSCE Bosnia and Herzegovina. He studied Political Science (International Relations), Philosophy, Public Law, and International Economics in Tübingen, Paris, and at the Free University Berlin, where he graduated in 2001 before receiving his PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) in 2008.