Energy resources and technologies are now more coveted than ever given their critical role in meeting countries’ energy needs and controlling strategic supply chains. Against this backdrop, this paper explores how Europe, France and Germany should navigate their energy partnerships. They must strike a balance between addressing security concerns – both its own and those of its partners – and boosting trade and industrial exchanges to strengthen competitiveness by consolidating the European industrial base. Europe must make strategic decisions about which
resources to exploit for critical purposes, which to protect and, above all, how to promote recycling industries and the circular economy to structurally reduce demand for minerals. A roadmap could help to identify and focus on key drivers of Europe’s attractiveness.
The era of Western predominance, dependable alliances and capable multilateral institutions has given way to shifting balances of power and deepening uncertainty. Few actors face this shift as acutely as the European Union (EU). The central challenge for the EU is not how to defend a familiar system but how to remain secure and relevant in an unfamiliar one, with the ability to shape what lies ahead. This paper addresses four important areas in which Europe must revise outdated assumptions to navigate the new emerging order: critical economic dependencies, European defence, democracy in the age of AI and international alliances. The EU’s most important task is to turn its apparent weaknesses into a strategic advantage. The very rules and slow, technical procedures often criticised for slowing the Union down can also make it predictable, fostering trust and reliability. As Washington reduces relations to short-lived transactions and Beijing weaponises them, the EU can credibly promise partners something rarer: commitments that outlast any single election or summit.
14. Genshagener Forum für deutsch-französischen Dialog
The European Union (EU) has launched the European Health Union to strengthen the global health architecture and health systems in its member states and worldwide. These efforts are, however, highly constrained by critical dependencies on external inputs, most prominently medical products and financial contributions to the global health architecture. The EU must overcome these dependencies through mutually beneficial partnerships with countries facing similar challenges. Europe’s ability to forge these partnerships will depend on overcoming the “donor-recipient” mindset, enabling local value creation and creating multilateral structures that also serve new allies. France and Germany can become important drivers in making a new offer to potential partners to jointly diversify supply chains and finance the global health architecture. The honest starting point is a unified European and, in particular, a unified Franco-German voice.
At the heart of economic security, technological resilience is a backbone of the European Union’s (EU) competitiveness. The EU’s energy and digital transitions rely on critical raw materials (CRMs), the supply of which is increasingly constrained by export restrictions, creating significant challenges for EU industries. In order to “de- risk” by reducing one-sided dependencies, the EU needs to build its own value chains, further innovation and diversify its suppliers. France and Germany, Europe’s main economies, share this diagnosis, but while France prioritises a state-geared industrial policy, Germany follows a market-driven path. However different political traditions do not have to be an obstacle but can complement each other in a joint European raw materials strategy.
Levelling up the European defence industry will require vision and action in three major areas: leadership formats and political decision-making; capabilities, procurement and funding; and creating a genuinely European strategic culture. The key task for European countries will be navigating these challenges simultaneously and ensuring that the measures constitute a coherent strategy. Especially France and Germany as the biggest EU member states, alongside the UK, Italy and Poland as partners, should lead the way: the window of opportunity for political ambition in this format is limited in light of the French presidential elections in 2027 and must not be wasted.
This paper looks at how France and Germany are dealing with demographic decline – and why this matters for Europe as a whole. It explores the pressures ageing populations put on labour markets, welfare systems and regional balance, and highlights where the two countries diverge and where they must act together. The focus is on practical policy options and the role of Franco-German cooperation in turning demographic risk into strategic opportunity. Rather than offering quick fixes, there is a need for coordinated, long-term strategies to safeguard the sustainability of European welfare models and enhance economic competitiveness. As demographic pressures mount, such joint efforts serve as an example of how ageing societies can respond – not with resignation, but with reform, innovation and shared leadership.
Beim JugendLabor „KulturPass“ haben junge Erwachsene aus Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen Vorschläge zur Weiterentwicklung des KulturPasses erarbeitet, um die kulturelle Teilhabe junger Menschen im Weimarer Dreieck zu stärken.
Pünktlich zum Ende der politischen Sommerpause 2024 in Brüssel, Paris, Warschau und Berlin analysieren Thierry Chopin, Melchior Szczepanik und Linn Selle im Rückblick die Perspektiven Frankreichs, Polens und Deutschlands auf die Europawahlen sowie deren Folgen auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene.
